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 1 
Summary 
Notwithstanding the extensive prevalence of violence against women, with 
its devastating consequences, this violence is a neglected issue within the 
international human rights regime. These acts of violence are not one-off 
incidents, isolated from one another – the violence is structural and systemic 
and thereby the state has a responsibility. Nevertheless, violence committed 
by private individuals has been, and still is to quite some extent, seen as a 
private issue and states have been reluctant to interfere at the same time as it 
has been an issue falling within the states’ sovereign powers. 
 
The internationalising elements of systemic violence are, however, to an 
ever-increasing extent being recognised. Today, we can with certainty claim 
that systemic violence against women is an issue within the international 
human rights regime, but can we claim that there is an international law 
prohibiting systemic violence? By analysing international instruments and 
bodies, the thesis strives to find an answer to this question. 
 
In the process of clarifying the notion of systemic violence against women, 
this thesis is as well examining the criticism of the gendered nature of the 
public/private dichotomy, as demonstrated by radical feminist legal theory. 
This is mainly done in the light of the international provisions on torture. 
 
After analysing international instruments and bodies, this thesis concludes 
that there is an international human rights law prohibiting systemic violence. 
If adopting a contemporary approach to customary international law, there is 
authoritative evidence of a universal legal principle prohibiting systemic 
violence. Further, there is such a prohibition due to the fact that systemic 
violence impairs or nullifies a woman's ability to enjoy her human rights – 
systemic violence is not a violation of human rights per se. Moreover, in 
order to adequately crystallise systemic violence as a violation of 
international human rights law, there is a need of additional work such as: to 
specify the substance of different forms of systemic violence as well as the 
responsibilities of states; to integrate systemic violence into mainstream 
instruments and bodies and; to acknowledge systemic violence as a 
violation of human rights per se. 
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Sammanfattning 
Oaktat att våld mot kvinnor är så omfattande och med de förödande 
konsekvenser som det innebär, är detta våld ett försummat problem inom de 
internationella mänskliga rättigheterna. Våld mot kvinnor är inte enskilda 
och isolerade händelser – våldet är strukturellt och systematiskt och därmed 
har staten ett ansvar. Likväl har våld som begås av privata individer setts 
som en privat fråga, vilket det fortfarande ses som i stor utsträckning, och 
stater har varit motvilliga till att ingripa samtidigt som detta problem har 
varit en del av staters självbestämmanderätt. 
 
De internationella elementen hos systematiskt våld mot kvinnor börjar 
emellertid i allt större utsträckning att bli erkända. Vi kan idag med säkerhet 
påstå att systematiskt våld mot kvinnor är ett högst aktuellt ämne inom de 
internationella mänskliga rättigheterna, men kan vi påstå att systematiskt 
våld mot kvinnor är förbjudet inom internationell rätt? Genom att analysera 
internationella instrument och organ, ämnar denna uppsats att hitta ett svar 
på denna fråga. 
 
I processen att klargöra hur systematiskt våld mot kvinnor mottas inom den 
internationella rätten undersöker uppsatsen dessutom den kritik som 
radikalfeminismen framför av den delning som görs mellan den privata och 
den publika sfären inom de internationella mänskliga rättigheterna. Denna 
analys görs huvudsakligen i ljuset av de internationella föreskrifterna om 
tortyr. 
 
Efter att ha analyserat internationella instrument och organ dras slutsatsen 
att systematiskt våld är ett brott mot de internationella mänskliga 
rättigheterna. En tillämpning av den moderna teorin om hur internationell 
sedvanerätt uppkommer visar att det finns auktoritativa bevis på att 
systematiskt våld är förbjudet inom den internationella rätten. Denna 
rättsliga princip består i att systematiskt våld hindrar kvinnor från att åtnjuta 
sina mänskliga rättigheter – systematiskt våld är inte ett brott mot de 
mänskliga rättigheterna i sig. För att ytterligare stärka och befästa 
systematiskt våld som ett brott mot de mänskliga rättigheterna behöver fler 
åtgärder att vidtas, exempelvis: att definiera olika typer av systematiskt våld 
likväl som att specificera vilket ansvar stater har; att integrera systematiskt 
våld inom internationella instrument och organ med en bred omfattning och; 
att erkänna systematiskt våld som ett brott mot de mänskliga rättigheterna i 
sig. 
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Abbreviations 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Problem 
Violence against women is universal and it is not random – the common 
denominator is being a woman. Women face violence at the hands of the 
state, the community and the family. It is prevalent in every society in the 
world and it cuts across boundaries of culture, ethnicity and wealth. The 
violence is a result of historically unequal power relations between women 
and men and the inequality is structural and systemic. It has been claimed 
that '[v]iolence against women is the greatest human rights scandal of our 
times'1. 
 
The perpetrator is in most cases a private individual, not a state agent, and 
most girls and women are abused by someone they know – a husband, a 
boyfriend, a father, a brother, an uncle or a friend. Violence committed by 
private individuals has been, and still is to quite some extent, seen as 
something only concerning the individuals themselves and since occurring 
within the private sphere, states have been reluctant to interfere. This non-
interference involves an acceptance of violence against women and 
contributes to its continuance. 
 
Due to the conception of the private nature of this form of violence, it has 
been an issue falling within the states’ sovereign powers, thereby a 
neglected issue within the international human rights regime. Governments, 
courts and policy-makers are, however, to an ever-increasing extent 
recognising the public and internationalising elements of systemic violence 
against women. 
 
Today, we can with certainty claim that systemic violence against women is 
an issue within the international human rights regime, but can we claim that 
there is an international law prohibiting systemic violence? By analysing 
international instruments and bodies, the thesis strives to find an answer to 
this question. 
 
What I claim is that the right to be free from systemic violence shall qualify 
as an international human rights law. I claim this due to the severe and 
dreadful nature of this form of violence and my idea of international law as 
being an important body of law in regulating state behaviour by setting a 
standard for states to endeavour. 
 
                                                
1 Amnesty International, 'It's in our hands: Stop violence against women' (Amnesty 
International Publications 2004) 1 
 5 
1.2 Purpose and research questions 
The general purpose with this thesis is to examine international instruments 
and bodies to clarify the notion of systemic violence against women as a 
human rights violation. By doing this, the thesis aims to contribute to an 
understanding of the need of further advancement in order to adequately 
incorporate systemic violence into the human rights regime – in terms of 
systemic violence as a violation of international human rights law. 
 
A minor part of the analysis of the notion of systemic violence within the 
regime will be composed of an examination of the criticism of the gendered 
nature of the public/private dichotomy, as demonstrated by radical feminist 
legal theorists. This analysis is thought of as being a tool in the process of 
clarifying the notion of systemic violence against women as a human rights 
violation. 
 
To fulfil this purpose, the following research questions are important and 
appropriate to examine: 
 
− What are the sources of international law and how do we know if a 
violation of a right has reached the status as an international law? 
− Radical feminist legal theory is criticising international human rights 
law for not encompassing women's rights and argue the main 
obstacle being the gendered nature of the public/private dichotomy – 
what does this critique imply? 
− How is systemic violence received and answered in international 
instruments and bodies? 
− How is the gendered nature of the public/private divide visible when 
studying the international provisions on torture? 
 
1.3 Scope and delimitations 
In order to examine these questions, the thesis will focus on the main 
international institution, namely the United Nations (UN) and its organs. 
However, as being far from the only institution creating policies and 
principles there is a need to scrutinise other bodies as well. Therefore, the 
thesis will likewise examine instruments and bodies of the Council of 
Europe, the Inter-American system as well as the African system. 
 
There will be a presentation of the sources of international law with a focus 
on customary international law due to its importance when studying human 
rights law. There are two main approaches to customary international law, 
the traditional and the contemporary, which will be examined. 
 
Further focus in this thesis will be put on literature written by radical 
feminist theorists in order to examine what is implied when claiming that 
the human rights regime is gendered. 
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This thesis will only examine violence against women, thus having a 
gender-perspective due to its analysis of the intersection between gender and 
violence. I refer to the victim as female and the perpetrator as male. This 
means that when speaking of systemic violence and other forms of violence 
I refer to violence committed by men against women only. 
 
The restricted scope of this thesis makes it necessary to make delimitations 
as to coverage. If there is a principle in international law prohibiting 
systemic violence, states have a corresponding duty to protect women. This 
means that states must take reasonable steps and implement certain 
measures in order to fulfil this obligation. The substance and nature of these 
measures will not be examined in this thesis. Consequently, focus is on 
whether there is a principle in international human rights law prohibiting 
systemic violence and not what such an obligation entails. 
 
1.4 Method, theory and sources 
The method used in this thesis can be defined as a 'traditional legal method'. 
This involves a consultation of different legal sources in order to answer the 
research questions – both primary sources and secondary sources. All 
sources have been carefully selected in order to produce a result of high 
reliability. 
 
When examining the sources of international law my method has involved 
turning to both primary sources, i.e., the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ Statute), as well as to secondary sources in the form of 
academic literature addressing and elaborating on the nature of the sources 
of international law. When analysing the gendered nature of the 
public/private dichotomy, writings of prominent radical feminist legal 
scholars have been examined. Further, my method when studying the notion 
of systemic violence within the human rights regime has comprised 
analysing international conventions, declarations, resolutions and reports as 
well as jurisprudence of international courts and treaty monitoring bodies. In 
addition to strictly academic material, official websites of UN, Council of 
Europe, Organization of American States and African Commission have 
been used. 
 
The thesis is partly having a radical feminist legal perspective. The criticism 
of the gendered nature of the public/private dichotomy, as demonstrated by 
radical feminist legal theory, will be studied and thereafter used as a tool in 
analysing the notion of systemic violence within the regime. This 
perspective has been chosen for two main reasons; my personal curiosity in 
learning about this criticism and the value of the critique in the light of the 
regime in present time. 
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1.5 Disposition 
This thesis will have the following structure. The chapter following this 
introduction, Chapter 2, provides a background to systemic violence in 
connection to international human rights law. First, the reader is provided a 
presentation of systemic violence and how it is understood in this thesis. Its 
internationalising elements will also be analysed. Thereafter, there will be a 
short introduction to the doctrine of state responsibility as well as an 
examination of the sources of international law. The chapter is meant to 
provide the reader with some basic knowledge needed in order to grasp the 
following study. 
 
Chapter 3 is examining what radical feminist theory argues to be the main 
reason for the marginalisation of women's rights – the public/private 
dichotomy. The chapter opens with explaining what this divide signify, 
before analysing what this school of thought refers to when claiming that 
the divide is gendered. 
 
Subsequently, Chapter 4 provides an analysis of international instruments 
and bodies. This chapter is disposed differently than the other chapters in 
this thesis. After studying a specific category of instruments or a specific 
institution there is a subchapter providing the reader with some implications 
and comments. The desire is to make the research more clear and 
comprehensible, as there are quite a big number of instruments being 
studied. This chapter ends with an analysis of the international provisions on 
torture in the light of systemic violence against women as well as the 
criticism examined in Chapter 3. 
 
Lastly, in Chapter 5, the results of the thesis are analysed and later 
summarised and concluded in Chapter 6. 
 8 
2 Systemic violence – its nature 
and place in international law 
This chapter will serve as an introduction to systemic violence and its place 
in international law. I claim that the right to be free from systemic violence 
shall qualify as an international human rights law. Following this claim, 
there is a need to explain why I make this argument as well as what this 
entails. Further, the reader will be provided with a presentation of the 
sources of international law, having a focus on customary international law, 
as being of particular importance for international human rights law and, 
more specific, its importance for women’s human rights. 
 
2.1 Systemic violence 
 
2.1.1 Definition of systemic violence and its 
internationalising elements 
The thesis is focusing on a form of violence that will be referred to as 
systemic violence. This is not the same as systemic intimate violence. 
Systemic violence comprises systemic intimate violence but is broader in 
the sense that it also includes what is often referred to as acquaintance rape. 
This is understood as rape and other forms of sexual violence by a man 
whom the woman has just met or knows superficially. What I claim is that 
the right to be free from systemic violence shall qualify as an international 
human rights law. To claim that the right to be free from systemic intimate 
violence shall qualify as an international human rights law would leave this 
severe form of violence outside the responsibility of states. 
 
Accordingly, the thesis has its focus on the abuse that falls within the 
definition of systemic intimate violence as well as acquaintance rape. To 
define systemic violence and to explain the difference between systemic 
violence and systemic intimate violence, I will use the definition of systemic 
intimate violence as understood by the legal scholar Bonita Meyersfeld in 
her book Domestic Violence and International Law.2 
 
Meyersfeld's definition of systemic intimate violence encompasses five 
elements: 1) severe emotional or physical harm or the threat thereof; 2) a 
continuum of harm as opposed to one-off incidents; 3) committed 
predominantly by men against women within intimate relationships; 4) the 
victim belongs to a group more vulnerable to harm - in this case women as a 
group; and 5) the violence is systemic in the sense of states failure to 
                                                
2 Bonita Meyersfeld, Domestic Violence and International Law (Hart Publishing 2010) 
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intervene.3 Meyersfeld refers to systemic intimate violence as constituting 
the severe forms of domestic violence. 
 
International law only copes with severe forms of physical, psychological 
and emotional harm. This is evident if looking at, i.a., A v the United 
Kingdom where the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) argued that 
physical harm must reach 'a minimum level of severity'4 and the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (UNCAT), which is applicable when there has been 'severe pain 
and suffering'5. Michael Johnson, a sociology theorist, distinguishes 
between what he calls 'patriarchal terrorism' and 'common couple violence'. 
Johnson explains the former as acts of terrorism in the sense of patriarchal 
traditions of husband's and men's right to control their wives and women. 
This control is a systematic use of violence and other forms of abuse. 
'Common couple violence' on the other hand, is not systematic and less a 
product of patriarchy. Johnson refers to these incidents as minor forms of 
violence.6 The former should trigger the responsibility of states under 
international law whereas the latter should not. Although, it is debatable and 
questionable which acts of men’s violence against women – if any – are not 
systemic and not a product of the patriarchal society that we live in, I find 
Johnson's two definitions of violence, to some extent, useful in explaining 
which acts of violence that should trigger international law. However, I 
would like to ask the reader to be very careful when making this distinction 
since the violence referred to as 'common couple violence' is only to be 
found in very exceptional cases. In addition, there may be a risk of states to 
abuse this distinction in order to escape from their international 
responsibilities. 
 
The element of continuum of harm refers to the case where acts of violence 
individually are not being of a severe nature but when an accumulation of 
acts over a prolonged period of time, are sufficiently severe to pose a 
violation of the woman's human rights.7 
 
The third element in Meyersfeld's definition of systemic intimate violence is 
the requirement of the abuse to appear between intimates. This element is 
necessary in order to label the abuse as domestic violence. As Meyersfeld 
describes, violence between intimates distinguishes from other forms of 
violence in society – one feature being the woman's ability to escape due to 
the abuse taking place in her private sphere, in her home.8 
                                                
3 Bonita Meyersfeld, Domestic Violence and International Law (Hart Publishing 2010) 111 
4 A v the United Kingdom App no 100/1997/884/1096 (ECtHR 23 September 1998) para 
20 
5 UNCAT (adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987) UNGA Res 39/46 
art 1 
6 Michael P Johnson, 'Patriarchal Terrorism and Common Couple Violence: Two Forms of 
Violence against Women' (1995) 57 Journal of Marriage and the Family 283, 285-286 
7 Bonita Meyersfeld, Domestic Violence and International Law (Hart Publishing 2010) 
118-122 
8 Bonita Meyersfeld, Domestic Violence and International Law (Hart Publishing 2010) 
122-123 
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The fourth element is the vulnerability of women as a group to this form of 
violence. Violence against women is a product of traditional and historical 
attitudes where women are discriminated and dominated by men. Prejudice 
of stereotyped roles and practices justify violence as a form of control of 
women. The locus being the home, poses the queries of when state 
interference in the private sphere shall be justified. And the threat of 
increased violence if the woman is separating from the man, economic 
difficulties and the society's stigma against abused women, makes it difficult 
for her to leave the abusive relationship.9 
 
The final element refers to the action of the state – or rather the lack of 
action. The violence is systemic in the sense that the state is failing to 
adequately protect women from violence – that is to prevent as well as to 
respond to this violence in the form of police investigation, prosecution, 
conviction, economic assistance, health care, shelters etc.10 
 
Having the definition of systemic intimate violence, it is apparent that 
acquaintance rape does not fall within its definition. I have chosen to 
include this form of violence in my study since it has similar characteristics 
as systemic intimate violence. It is a form of severe physical, psychological 
and emotional harm, committed predominantly by men against women, the 
victim belongs to a group more vulnerable to harm and a group in society 
which is being discriminated, and the violence is systemic. What 
distinguishes an acquaintance rape from systemic intimate violence is that 
the former does not take place within an intimate relationship and as a 
consequence, it is normally a one-off incident. 
 
Acquaintance rape, just as domestic violence, is structural and systemic and 
there is a high prevalence of acquaintance rape in all societies as well as a 
lack of response from state authorities. Therefore, I claim that the right to be 
free from both systemic intimate violence and acquaintance rape shall 
qualify as an international human rights law. Henceforth, when referring to 
both these forms of abuse, the term systemic violence will be used, whereas 
when referring to the former only, the term systemic intimate violence will 
be used. 
 
2.1.2 An issue for international law? 
It would not make sense to write a thesis with the purpose to examine 
international and regional instruments and bodies in order to find out about 
the notion of systemic violence as a human rights issue, without asking the 
question why it is useful – if it is – to formulate a norm prohibiting systemic 
violence in international law. 
                                                
9 Bonita Meyersfeld, Domestic Violence and International Law (Hart Publishing 2010) 
123-134 
10 Bonita Meyersfeld, Domestic Violence and International Law (Hart Publishing 2010) 
134-142 
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International law is often criticised for being a weak body of law. It is 
argued that the body lacks effective enforcement mechanisms and an 
authority with the competence and resources to ensure that states comply 
with their international obligations.11 I claim, however, that international 
law is an important body of law in that it regulates state behaviour by setting 
a standard for states to endeavour. This theory, as opposed to compliance 
due to force, is supported by legal scholars and can be referred to as the 
'theory of non-coercive state compliance'12. 
 
International law has an expressive as well as an implementing function. To 
label a form of harm, which falls outside the scope of the international legal 
framework, is to classify a lawful behaviour as unlawful. This expressive 
character of international law has a reformative effect in the way that it 
exerts an influence on national laws. The implementing function of 
international law requires states to change their laws in order to correspond 
with international standards.13 
 
The identification of mass rape by the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda and International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, is 
an example of the expressive value of international law.14 Prohibiting a 
conduct in international law, gives international bodies the tool to hold 
states responsible for its failure to protect its people at the same time as it 
puts a pressure on states to change its national laws – either through 
compulsion or through non-coercive means. Female genital cutting, which is 
a form of gender-based violence, is another example of a struggle within the 
international community that has had a great influence on domestic legal 
systems.15 
 
Having this knowledge, I argue that prohibiting systemic violence in 
international law would have a not insignificant potential to change how 
states respond to this form of abuse. 
 
                                                
11 See e.g. Harold Hongju Koh, 'Why do Nations Obey International Law?' (1997) 106 Yale 
Law Journal 2599, 2610-2611; Oona A Hathaway, 'Do Human Rights Treaties Make a 
Difference?' (2002) 111 Yale Law Journal 1935 
12 Bonita Meyersfeld, Domestic Violence and International Law (Hart Publishing 2010) 
252-254 
13 Bonita Meyersfeld, Domestic Violence and International Law (Hart Publishing 2010) 
266-269 
14 See e.g. the analysis by Meyersfeld in Bonita Meyersfeld, Domestic Violence and 
International Law (Hart Publishing 2010) 269-274 
15 See e.g. the analysis by Meyersfeld in Bonita Meyersfeld, Domestic Violence and 
International Law (Hart Publishing 2010) 279-283 
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2.2 Doctrine of state responsibility in 
relation to systemic violence 
If we would conclude that systemic violence is an international human 
rights violation, the state would have a corresponding duty to protect this 
right. This means that if the state fails to protect a woman from systemic 
violence, the state would be in breach of international law and accordingly, 
the principles of state responsibility would be applicable. This subchapter 
will briefly identify the principles of the doctrine of state responsibility. 
 
The doctrine of state responsibility holds a state responsible for '[e]very 
internationally wrongful act'16. There are two elements of an internationally 
wrongful act: first, the act or omission shall be attributable to the state under 
international law; second, the act or omission shall constitute a breach of an 
international obligation.17 This doctrine distinguishes between two sets of 
rules. The primary rules of state responsibility define the content of state 
responsibility, whereas the secondary rules define the obligations that arise 
when a state violates a human right.18 
 
Originally, the focus of the doctrine was on direct action of the state in the 
public sphere, i.e., when a state organ or a state agent conducted a wrongful 
act.19 As a response to the fact that state agents are not the sole – or even the 
primary – perpetrator of human rights violations, the doctrine has been re-
interpreted and expanded to hold the state accountable for violations that 
was not originally considered human rights issues. Accordingly, states can 
be held liable for failing to meet their international obligations even when 
substantive breaches of human rights are derived from the acts of private 
individuals. The recognition to hold a state accountable for its failure to 
exercise due diligence in preventing, investigating and punishing violations 
of non-state actors was recognised in the case of Velasquez Rodriguez v 
Honduras.20 According to this theory, a state has a duty to 'take reasonable 
steps to prevent human rights violations and to use the means at the state's 
disposal to carry out a serious investigation of violations committed within 
its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate 
punishment and to ensure the victim adequate compensation'21. This 
development of state responsibility is particularly important in the case of 
systemic violence since this violence is taking place within the private 
sphere. 
 
                                                
16 ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with 
commentaries' (November 2001) UN Doc A/56/10 art 1 
17 ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with 
commentaries (November 2001) UN Doc A/56/10 art 2 
18 ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with 
commentaries (November 2001) UN Doc A/56/10 para 1 
19 ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with 
commentaries (November 2001) UN Doc A/56/10 chapter II 
20 Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras (IACtHR 29 July 1988) 
21 Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras (IACtHR 29 July 1988) para 174 
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2.3 Sources of international law 
There is no doubt that violence against women is a global human rights 
concern. There are countless of international instruments, bodies, reports 
and statements, focusing on and discussing violence against women. Despite 
this attention within various areas of the human rights regime, there is less 
clear whether a prohibition of systemic violence is part of international law. 
This subchapter will examine the sources of international law with the aim 
to serve as a foundation when analysing international instruments and 
bodies in Chapter 4. 
 
2.3.1 Generally accepted sources 
There are four recognised sources of international law, being: 1) treaties and 
conventions; 2) customary international law; 3) general principles of law; 
and 4) legal jurisprudence.22 These sources are defined in article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute).23 The Permanent 
Court of International Justice, later replaced by the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ), was established as the first permanent international court to 
settle controversies between states. Thereby, there was a need to decide on 
the applicable sources of law.24 However, it is argued that article 38 of the 
ICJ Statute is inadequate in the way that there are other sources of 
international law not mentioned in this provision. UN resolutions and 
declarations are two of these sources.25 This will be further discussed below. 
 
The most authoritative sources of international law are treaties and 
conventions. A treaty or a convention binds a state when the state has signed 
the same and thereby the state is obliged to fulfil the principles contained in 
the specific instrument. The binding nature of a treaty is stated in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).26 
 
Customary international law is an 'international custom, as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law'27. It consists of two elements: 1) a 
consistent practice of states, being both widespread and established; and 2) 
opinio juris – a subjective element understood as the belief that the state is 
obliged to do what it is doing. In other words, the state is acting in 
                                                
22 Hugh Thirlway, 'The sources of international law' in Malcolm D Evans (ed), 
International Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2006) 115 
23 ICJ Statute (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 
24 Hugh Thirlway, 'The sources of international law' in Malcolm D Evans (ed), 
International Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2006) 118 
25 Hugh Thirlway, 'The sources of international law' in Malcolm D Evans (ed), 
International Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2006) 119, 136-137. See also Alan 
Boyle and Christine Chinkin, The Making of International Law (Oxford University Press 
2007) 
26 VCLT (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) art 26  
27 ICJ Statute (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) art 38 (b) 
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accordance with international law from a sense of legal obligation.28 This 
was later re-stated in the ICJ judgement, North Sea Continental Shelf.29 Due 
to the complexities of customary international law and its importance to 
answering the research questions, this source will be further discussed in the 
next subchapter. 
 
General principles of law are to be turned to in the case where the issue in 
question is not regulated in any treaty and there is no established rule of 
custom. Legal scholars have not come to an agreement on the nature of 
these principles. It is suggested that these general principles of law can be 
derived from various systems of municipal law when shared and developed 
by a majority of them.30 The subsidiary sources, the fourth source as 
declared by the ICJ Statute, are judicial decisions and teachings. This 
comprises judgements of international and regional courts and national 
jurisprudence as well as teachings of respected legal scholars.31 
 
2.3.2 Complexities of customary international 
law 
Customary international law has become an important source of law in the 
area of human rights. As will be discovered in Chapter 4, there is no 
international treaty prohibiting systemic violence or systemic intimate 
violence, thus render the necessity to analyse customary international law. 
 
The elements of customary international law are problematic and they raise 
a number of questions. When is a practice widespread? How does one 
determine what states actually believe as opposed to what they say? What if 
a state agree that something is law but at the same time fails to comply with 
the same? Is custom or opinio juris weightier? 
 
The number of states needed in order to fulfil the requirement of a 
widespread and consistent state practice is particularly important in regard 
to systemic violence, having in mind the lack of criminalisation of this form 
of violence in many states of the world. It is argued that a practice must not 
be applied in every single state as long as it is consistent and widespread.32 
An important element of a customary international law is its generality. It is 
proposed that two main factors shall be taken into account: 1) 'express 
acceptance of the rule by a reasonable number of states belonging to various 
                                                
28 Hugh Thirlway, 'The sources of international law' in Malcolm D Evans (ed), 
International Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2006) 122 
29 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v 
Denmark/Netherlands) ICJ Reports 1969 para 77 
30 Hugh Thirlway, 'The sources of international law' in Malcolm D Evans (ed), 
International Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2006) 127-129 
31 Hugh Thirlway, 'The sources of international law' in Malcolm D Evans (ed), 
International Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2006) 129-130 
32 Hugh Thirlway, 'The sources of international law' in Malcolm D Evans (ed), 
International Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2006) 124 
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regional groups and representing different political, economic and 
ideological approaches'33; and 2) 'acquiescence by other states'34. This 
concludes that the conduct of states shall be consistent in general. If a state 
does not comply with a given rule, this should be seen as a breach of 
customary international law rather than as recognition of a new rule. This is 
the case even when there are several states acting inconsistent with a 
specific rule.35 Further, it is argued that customary international law can 
develop already when a principle is generally accepted at an international 
conference. That means that a rule can become customary international law 
before the actual convention has been signed.36 
 
To determine a state's actual belief is quite difficult, therefore, opinio juris is 
in this thesis understood as statements of belief and not actual beliefs. This 
means that a treaty is conceived as opinio juris rather than state action – it 
states the legality of state action.37 
 
Given the high prevalence of violence against women in every community 
of the world and the reluctance of states to intervene in the private sphere, 
would it be correct to assume that systemic violence is not prohibited in 
customary international law? Due to the existence of violence, it is difficult 
to see that states are acting as if there was such a prohibition, as well as if 
they believe that they are legally obliged to act in conformity with the same. 
The problem of this so-called ‘two-element theory’38 has been argued and 
analysed by countless legal scholars. As a respond to this debate, there has 
developed two main approaches to customary international law, namely, 
traditional and modern or contemporary approaches. 
 
2.3.2.1 Traditional approach 
The traditional approach to customary international law emphasises state 
practice. This theory requires a general and consistent practice of states and 
perceives opinio juris as a secondary element in the sense that it determines 
whether the state is legally bound by a rule or not. The traditional approach 
is action-based but both elements must be present in order to constitute a 
legal rule.39 
                                                
33 Louis B Sohn, '”Generally Accepted” International Rules' (1986) 61 Washington Law 
Review 1073, 1074 
34 Louis B Sohn, '”Generally Accepted” International Rules' (1986) 61 Washington Law 
Review 1073, 1074 
35 Hugh Thirlway, 'The sources of international law' in Malcolm D Evans (ed), 
International Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2006) 124-125 
36 Louis B Sohn, '”Generally Accepted” International Rules' (1986) 61 Washington Law 
Review 1073, 1077 
37 See e.g. Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, 'Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary 
International Law: a Reconciliation' (2001) 95 The American Journal of International Law 
757, 757-758 
38 For this classification, see e.g. Hugh Thirlway, 'The sources of international law' in 
Malcolm D Evans (ed), International Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2006) 122 
39 Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, 'Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary 
International Law: a Reconciliation' (2001) 95 The American Journal of International Law 
757, 757-758. There are other views as well within the traditional theory of customary 
 16 
 
A study on the ICJ's interpretation of customary international law, as 
advocated by some legal scholars, suggests two additional elements: 1) the 
practice in question must be evident among a majority of 'specially affected' 
states; and 2) the practice must take place over a period of time.40 
 
2.3.2.2 Contemporary approach 
The contemporary approach is, as opposed to the traditional approach, 
primarily focusing on the subjective element – opinio juris.41 It emphasises 
statements rather than state practice and principles in international human 
rights instruments derived from the Charter of the UN as well as other 
universal instruments, are recognised as legal rules.42 Advocates of the 
contemporary theory argue that international principles of law can be 
derived from i.a., declarations and resolutions adopted by the UN General 
Assembly, diplomatic correspondence, international and national judicial 
judgements, practice of international organs, domestic legislation, opinion 
of official legal advisers and a pattern of treaties focusing on the same 
issue.43 Resolutions and declarations passed by the UN General Assembly, 
adopted unanimously or near-unanimously, demonstrate evidence of opinio 
juris.44 Due to the features of this theory, contemporary custom can develop 
faster than traditional custom. 
 
2.3.2.3 Traditional or contemporary? 
There is support for the contemporary approach to customary international 
law, but it is contentious and has been criticised amongst legal scholars. 
Some of this support can be found in the jurisprudence of the ICJ. In the 
judgement of Nicaragua v the US, the ICJ claimed that non-binding General 
Assembly resolutions may be evidence of opinio juris.45 
 
One main criticism of the contemporary theory is its lack of a general and 
consistent state practice – the lack of an inductive process. Thereby, it has 
been argued that it cannot be justified as a social phenomenon or a social 
                                                                                                                        
international law, however, this approach is argued to be the most accepted, see e.g. Bonita 
Meyersfeld, Domestic Violence and International Law (Hart Publishing 2010) 10-11 
40 Jo Lynn Slama, 'Opinio Juris in Customary International Law' (1990) 15 Oklahoma City 
University Law Review 603, 617-618 
41 Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, 'Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary 
International Law: a Reconciliation' (2001) 95 The American Journal of International Law 
757, 757-758 
42 Thomas Buergenthal, Dinah Shelton and David Stewart, International Human Rights in a 
Nutshell (4th edn, West 2002) 395 
43 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (7th edn, Oxford University Press 
2008) 3 
44 J Patrick Kelly, 'The Twilight of Customary International Law' (1999-2000) 40 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 449, 484 
45 Case concerning the military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v the US) (ICJ June 27 1986) cited in Patrick Kelly, 'The Twilight of 
Customary International Law' (1999-2000) 40 Virginia Journal of International Law 449, 
footnote 157 
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fact. Instruments being of a recommendatory nature, as resolutions and 
declarations, cannot serve as evidence of binding obligations as they are 
often enacted due to the fact that states are not willing to sign a treaty 
because of the legal commitment. Another argument, not in favour of the 
contemporary approach, is that state practice often is contrary to human 
rights norms.46 The strength in this later statement is questionable. It may be 
a relevant argument in the case of other areas of international law, but of 
less relevance in the case of human rights – this area of international law is 
directly affecting the lives of people, regulating the most fundamental 
aspects of private life. Can we justify the traditional approach to customary 
international law when states are violating the most fundamental rights of 
people in the case of such grave acts as rape where fundamental values are 
at stake simply because the practice of states is contrary to these principles? 
That would, without doubt, be both inappropriate and offensive. 
 
                                                
46 J Patrick Kelly, 'The Twilight of Customary International Law' (1999-2000) 40 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 449, 484-489 
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3 Radical feminist critique of the 
human rights regime 
3.1 Public/private dichotomy 
International human rights law claims to protect fundamental rights of all 
human beings.47 This is a statement feminist legal theorists do not agree 
with. Feminist legal theory criticises the human rights regime for the 
marginalisation of women's rights. In other words, they claim that women-
specific experiences of human rights abuses have not been adequately 
recognised. This school of thought basically argues for the inclusion of 
women in the human rights protection system. 
 
The criticism presented here is what radical feminist legal theory argues to 
be the main obstacle for the inclusiveness of women's rights, namely the 
gendered nature of the public/private dichotomy. The public/private divide 
is the central concept, which the human rights regime is based on and 
radical feminism argues for the need to erase this institutionalisation.48 An 
examination of this dichotomy is particularly relevant in a study of systemic 
violence due to the private nature of this violence. 
 
Following subchapter will describe and analyse what radical feminists mean 
when arguing the human rights regime to be gendered. The theory will 
thereafter, in Chapter 4, be applied to the torture provisions in international 
human rights law. 
 
3.2 The gendered nature of the 
public/private dichotomy 
Historically, women have been excluded from the public sphere of life, that 
is to say the labour market, education, politics etc. Places, which has been – 
and still is – dominated by men. Women, on the other hand, has been 
consigned to the private sphere of family and relationships with the primary 
responsibility of bearing and rearing children and taking care of the 
household, including taking care of the husband so that he can provide for 
the family. This boundary between the public and the private sphere was 
                                                
47 See e.g. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA 
Res 217 A(III) (UDHR) 
48 See e.g. Nadine Taub and Elizabeth M Schneider, 'Women's Subordination and the Role 
of Law' in D Kelly Weisberg (ed), Feminist legal theory: Foundations (Temple University 
Press 1993); Celina Romany, 'State Responsibility Goes Private: A Feminist Critique of the 
Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law' in Rebecca J Cook (ed), 
Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives (University of 
Pennsylvania Press 1994) 
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more clear in former times, however, it is still evident in all societies of the 
world. 
 
This split of women and men into different parts of the community has 
entailed a marginalisation of the experiences of women and their well-being 
within the human rights discourse – a conceptualisation of these issues as 
private issues has kept them outside the scope of international human rights 
law.49 
 
This division can be found at two levels within the human rights discourse. 
At the first level is the question of which issues should come under 
international supervision – defined as human rights – and what should 
belong to the state's sovereign power – defined as a private issue. At the 
second level is the question of whether only the relationship between the 
individual and the state – the public sphere – should fall within the 
boundaries of international human rights law, or whether relationships 
between individuals – the private sphere – should as well come within the 
human rights framework.50 
 
Men dominate both the public sphere and the private sphere. The public 
sphere is regulated by laws, whereas the law is largely absent in the private 
sphere, or there are laws but the states are reluctant to guarantee that women 
are protected in accordance with the same. The fact that laws to a large 
extent are absent in the private sphere, has in itself involved the male 
dominance and female subordination.51 
 
3.2.1 State responsibility stops on the doorstep 
As briefly described in Chapter 2, the doctrine of state responsibility defines 
the norms of a state's responsibility for an international wrongful act. 
Despite progresses of the doctrine to better protect women's rights, radical 
feminists argue that the gendered nature of the public/private divide is still 
reflected in the doctrine of state responsibility. This subchapter will explain 
what feminists refer to when criticising the second level of the 
public/private dichotomy. 
 
International law was historically primarily concerned with the relations 
among states while international human rights law was originally focused 
                                                
49 See e.g. Celina Romany, 'State Responsibility Goes Private: A Feminist Critique of the 
Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law' in Rebecca J Cook (ed), 
Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives (University of 
Pennsylvania Press 1994); Donna Sullivan, 'The Public/Private Distinction in International 
Human Rights Law' in Julie Peters (ed), Women's Rights, Human Rights: International 
Feminist Perspectives (Routledge 1995) 
50 Ivana Radacic, 'Human Rights of Women and the Public/Private Divide in International 
Human Rights Law' (2007) 3 Croatian Yearbook of European Law & Policy 443, 450-451 
51 Nadine Taub and Elizabeth M Schneider, 'Women's Subordination and the Role of Law' 
in D Kelly Weisberg (ed), Feminist legal theory: Foundations (Temple University Press 
1993) 11-13 
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on violations committed directly by the state against individuals in the 
public sphere, in accordance with the idea of non-interference. Due to this 
focus, abuses of women within the home and private sphere have been left 
outside the scope of human rights. This conceptualisation of the human 
rights regime has resulted in an insufficient recognition of private acts of 
violence against women as human rights violations, since these acts are 
committed by private persons within the private sphere.52 
 
Due to the fact that 'private' issues are left to the state's discretion, human 
rights have a great influence in the private sphere – by indirect means. The 
outcome of this divide, as argued, is to some extent a non-existing 
regulation of cultural and religious customs and practices that might allow, 
as well as render, the suppression and subordination of women.53 
 
3.2.2 Human rights as male rights 
Following subchapter is examining the criticism of the conceptualisation of 
human rights. Feminists argue that the gendered nature of the public/private 
divide can be seen in the primacy within the regime given to first-generation 
rights, i.e., the civil- and political rights. This is done at the expense of the 
second-generation rights, i.e., the social-, economic-, and cultural rights – 
despite the recognition of the indivisibility and interdependence of first and 
second generations of rights.54 Civil- and political rights are constructed in 
accordance to what men fear will happen to them. This is often referred to 
as 'human rights are men's rights'.55 
 
The liberal ideology reflected in the civil- and political rights discourse has 
predominantly been defined with the aim to protect individuals from direct 
governmental interference in private life. This has involved a contribution 
by states in the construction of the separation of private and public life.56 
 
Economic discrimination against women is common in every part of the 
world. This involves discrimination within the labour market as well as 
within the family. Women are discriminated in many societies in respect of 
access to education and medical care. When women's access to economic 
sources is either hampered or denied, the consequence is women's 
dependency upon men, which in turn means a reinforcement of violence 
against women. In addition, the state is both constructing and sustaining the 
                                                
52 Alice Edwards, Violence against women, (Cambridge University Press 2011) 64-65 
53 Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, The boundaries of international law: A 
feminist analysis (Manchester University Press 2000) 56-58 
54 Indivisibility and Interdependence of Economic, Social, Cultural, Civil and Political 
Rights (adopted 15 December 1989) UNGA Res 44/130 
55 Hilary Charlesworth, 'What are ”Women's International Human Rights”?' in Rebecca J 
Cook (ed), Human rights of women: National and International Perspectives (University of 
Pennsylvania Press 1994) 71 
56 Donna Sullivan, 'The Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law' in 
Julie Peters (ed), Women's Rights, Human Rights: International Feminist Perspectives 
(Routledge 1995) 126-127 
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power relations by actively regulate some areas of law, such as maternity 
leave, parents' allowance, often in a way less favourable to women. The 
consequence is a contribution to the existing subordination of women and 
women's dependency upon men. Women are actively placed in the private 
sphere. This state of dependency is contributing to systemic violence.57 
 
The language used in the law is also supporting the exclusion of women 
from the scope of the protection of human rights. It is argued that the use of 
a masculine vocabulary, i.a., the use of the masculine pronoun, is working 
to directly exclude women, as well as in a more discrete and indirect way.58 
The UNCAT's definition of torture is exemplifying this criticism, as will be 
analysed later in this thesis.59 
                                                
57  Donna Sullivan, 'The Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law' in 
Julie Peters (ed), Women's Rights, Human Rights: International Feminist Perspectives 
(Routledge 1995) 133-134 
58 Hilary Charlesworth, 'What are ”Women's International Human Rights”?' in Rebecca J 
Cook (ed), Human rights of women: National and International Perspectives (University of 
Pennsylvania Press 1994) 68 
59 See Chapter 4 
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4 Systemic violence in 
international instruments and 
bodies 
This chapter will study international instruments and bodies with the aim to 
see how systemic violence is received and answered within the international 
human rights law regime. In the first part, UN instruments and bodies are 
analysed before exploring the approach of regional human rights law within 
three different regional systems – European, Inter-American, and African 
system. The chapter will end with an analysis of the international provisions 
on torture in the light of the gendered nature of the public/private 
dichotomy. 
 
4.1 Systemic violence within UN 
instruments and bodies 
 
4.1.1 The binding convention and its 
monitoring body 
The first part of this chapter is examining the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)60 and the work 
of its monitoring body. 
 
4.1.1.1 CEDAW 
CEDAW, known as the women convention, was adopted by the UN General 
Assembly in 1979. It defines what constitutes discrimination against women 
and it sets up an agenda for appropriate measures and policies to eliminate 
discrimination against women.61 The treaty brings the state into the private 
realm, however, violence against women is not at all mentioned in the text 
of CEDAW. 
 
Although, there is no explicit reference to systemic violence or systemic 
intimate violence in the text of CEDAW, a prohibition on this violence may 
be deduced from article 1; a state's failure to protect a woman from this 
form of violence, which would have the effect of impairing or nullifying her 
                                                
60 CEDAW (adopted 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) UNGA Res 
34/180 
61 CEDAW (adopted 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) UNGA Res 
34/180 arts 1-3 
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ability to enjoy her human rights, on the basis of sex, may be interpreted as 
falling within this provision.62 
 
As of September 2012, 187 states are party to CEDAW.63 This is more than 
90 percent of UN's member states. However, it has one of the highest rates 
of reservations.64 A number of them being of a significant nature, thus it 
may be questioned which legal obligations that can be deduced from 
CEDAW. 65 Some states have even made reservations to CEDAW's core 
provision, article 2,66 despite the fact that a reservation may not be 
'incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty'67. 
 
There is no other international treaty specifically addressing violence 
against women. The thesis will therefore proceed to examine whether there 
are other international and regional instruments as well as jurisprudence of 
national and regional bodies providing any evidence of a prohibition of 
systemic violence in international customary law. 
 
4.1.1.2 General Recommendation No 19 
As examined above, the text of CEDAW is not explicitly addressing 
violence against women as a form of discrimination, aside from the 
provision dealing with prostitution and trafficking.68 This omission was later 
– to some extent – corrected when addressed in General Recommendation 
No 1969, where the CEDAW Committee declared that '[g]ender-based 
violence is a form of discrimination'70. Gender-based violence is defined as 
'violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that 
affects women disproportionately'71. It widened the definition of violence to 
                                                
62 See support for this interpretation in i.a. Bonita Meyersfeld, Domestic Violence and 
International Law (Hart Publishing 2010) 27 
63 See the official website of the UN Treaty Collection 
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
8&chapter=4&lang=en> accessed 7 September 2012 
64  The international law of treaties allows a state to make reservations to a treaty, see 
VCLT (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) art 19 
65 To find out more about the nature of the reservations, see Jo Lynn Southard, 'Protection 
of Women's Human Rights Under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women' (1996) 8 Pace International Law Review 1, 20-21 
66 See the official website of the UN Treaty Collection 
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
8&chapter=4&lang=en> accessed 7 September 2012 
67 VCLT (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) art 19(c) 
68 CEDAW (adopted 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) UNGA Res 
34/180 art 6 
69 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No 19: Violence against Women (1992) 
UN Doc A/47/38 
70 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No 19: Violence against Women (1992) 
UN Doc A/47/38 para 1 
71 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No 19: Violence against Women (1992) 
UN Doc A/47/38 para 6 
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encompass physical, sexual and psychological abuse, occurring both in the 
public and private spheres of life.72 
 
The violence addressed is violence committed both by private and public 
actors and states may be responsible for private acts of violence if failing to 
act with due diligence.73 Family violence is particularly addressed and it is 
conceived as a form of violence occurring in every society and affecting 
women of all ages.74 
 
4.1.1.3 Jurisprudence of the CEDAW Committee 
As discussed in Chapter 2, decisions of international bodies are sources of 
international law. This subchapter will analyse the jurisprudence of the 
CEDAW Committee. 
 
The adoption of the Optional Protocol to CEDAW made it possible for the 
CEDAW Committee to receive communications by or on behalf of private 
individuals. Only states that have ratified the protocol are subject to this 
jurisdiction.75 As of September 2012, 104 states are party to the Optional 
Protocol.76 The first decision was adopted in 2002 and since then there have 
been ten decisions on communications. Three of these rulings address 
domestic violence, thus of importance for this thesis. 
 
In the individual communication Ms AT v Hungary77, the applicant claimed 
that she had been subject to severe domestic violence on several occasions 
by her husband. The woman claimed that the state was in breach of 
CEDAW for its failure to provide her effective protection. The CEDAW 
Committee found that the Hungarian state had failed in its obligations to 
prevent and protect the applicant from violence because of the lack of 
specific legislation to combat domestic violence and temporary protection 
such as shelter and restraining order. The applicant's human rights and 
fundamental freedoms were violated and particularly her right to security of 
person.78 
 
                                                
72 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No 19: Violence against Women (1992) 
UN Doc A/47/38 para 6 
73 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No 19: Violence against Women (1992) 
UN Doc A/47/38 para 9 
74 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No 19: Violence against Women (1992) 
UN Doc A/47/38 para 23 
75 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (adopted 6 October 1999, entered into force 22 December 2000) UN Doc 
A/RES/54/4 art 1 
76 See the official website of the UN Treaty Collection 
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8-
b&chapter=4&lang=en> accessed 7 September 2012 
77 Ms AT v Hungary, CEDAW Committee, Communication No 2/2003 (adopted 26 January 
2005) UN Doc CEDAW/C/32/D/2/2003 
78 Ms AT v Hungary, CEDAW Committee, Communication No 2/2003 (adopted 26 January 
2005) UN Doc CEDAW/C/32/D/2/2003 paras 9.3-9.6  
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In Goekce (deceased) v Austria79, the woman was killed by her husband. 
She made several reports to the police, however, she was not consistent in 
her reports and she did not decide to leave her violent husband. Due to these 
circumstances, the state argued the difficulty to protect the woman from her 
husband.80 This ambivalence is of frequent occurrence in situations of 
domestic violence and if the Austrian state had had this knowledge, their 
response would probably have been different. 
 
In the case of Fatma Yildirim (deceased) v Austria81, the woman was also 
killed by her husband after being abused during a long period of time. She 
made several reports and asked for the husband to be detained but the only 
response she got from the authorities was a discussion from the police with 
the husband. 
 
Austria did have a comprehensive policy in regard to domestic violence. 
There was, however, a lack of enforcement.82 The CEDAW Committee 
found that the state had failed to exercise due diligence in order to protect 
these women in both cases.83 The Committee further stated that the 
'perpetrator's rights cannot supersede women's human rights to life and 
physical and mental integrity'84. 
 
4.1.1.4 Implications and comments 
So, what are the implications of CEDAW in relation to systemic violence? 
Since the text itself does not address this form of violence, a strict 
interpretation of international law – contemplate the treaty only – would 
result in the conclusion that systemic violence is not prohibited. Further, the 
number of reservations to CEDAW, have an effect on the existence of its 
principles in customary international law in relation to non-signatory states 
– both in terms of whether the provisions are customary international law as 
well as the substance of the same. This is due to the language of the 
reservations so one must examine those in order to find out about the exact 
reach in international customary law. However, since CEDAW in itself does 
not prohibit systemic violence, apparently neither would the provisions of 
CEDAW as international customary law prohibit systemic violence. 
                                                
79 Goekce (deceased) v Austria, CEDAW Committee, Communication (adopted 6 August 
2007) No 5/2005 UN Doc CEDAW/C/39/D/5/2005 
80 Goekce (deceased) v Austria, CEDAW Committee, Communication (adopted 6 August 
2007) No 5/2005 UN Doc CEDAW/C/39/D/5/2005 paras 4.13-4.14 
81 Fatma Yildirim v Austria, CEDAW Committee, Communication No 6/2005 (adopted 1 
October 2007) UN Doc CEDAW/C/39/D/6/2005 
82 Goekce (deceased) v Austria, CEDAW Committee, Communication (adopted 6 August 
2007) No 5/2005 UN Doc CEDAW/C/39/D/5/2005 para 12.1.2 
83 Goekce (deceased) v Austria, CEDAW Committee, Communication (adopted 6 August 
2007) No 5/2005 UN Doc CEDAW/C/39/D/5/2005 para 12.1.4; Fatma Yildirim v Austria, 
CEDAW Committee, Communication No 6/2005 (adopted 1 October 2007) UN Doc 
CEDAW/C/39/D/6/2005 para 12.1.5 
84 Goekce (deceased) v Austria, CEDAW Committee, Communication (adopted 6 August 
2007) No 5/2005 UN Doc CEDAW/C/39/D/5/2005 para 12.1.5; Fatma Yildirim v Austria, 
CEDAW Committee, Communication No 6/2005 (adopted 1 October 2007) UN Doc 
CEDAW/C/39/D/6/2005 para 12.1.5 
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General recommendations, as non-treaty instruments, are not binding upon 
states party to CEDAW. They are interpretations of the provisions in the 
Convention made by the CEDAW Committee – they are not instruments 
written and adopted by member states in the General Assembly. Although 
they provide important guidance on how to interpret and apply the actual 
text, the contribution to customary international law, on the other hand, is 
disputed. 
 
In addition, General Recommendation No 19 does not state that violence 
against women is a violation of human rights in itself. What it does argue is 
that violence against women is a form of discrimination, which impairs or 
nullifies the enjoyment of her human rights.85 The link between violence 
and discrimination is of course both important and correct but this liberal 
approach to systemic violence is inadequate in combating the same. 
However, more important in respect of the purpose with this thesis is the 
fact that systemic violence, within the framework of CEDAW, is not 
perceived as a violation of human rights per se – states are obliged to 
prevent, protect and investigate due to other human rights violations, such as 
the right to life and the right to liberty and security of person. 
 
In Ms AT v Hungary, the Hungarian state acknowledged that it was not 
ready to secure the 'internationally expected'86 protection for victims of 
domestic violence. By doing so, Hungary accepted both that there is such an 
international obligation as well as the fact that the state is compelled to 
comply with the same. Although, Hungary apparently lacked the conduct 
element, this statement is evidence of opinio juris – the belief that Hungary 
is obliged to adhere to this principle. Applying a contemporary approach, 
this communication may be evidence of a prohibition of domestic violence 
in customary international law. 
 
An examination of the communications dealing with domestic violence 
reveals that the CEDAW Committee is focusing less on the link between 
violence against women and discrimination. However, the Committee is still 
not recognising domestic violence as a violation of human rights in itself. 
Being the monitoring body to the only women-specific treaty with an 
international reach, and still today perceiving domestic violence as a 
violation of a woman's human rights due to the fact that it violates other 
human rights, is noteworthy. 
 
                                                
85 CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No 19: Violence against Women (1992) 
UN Doc A/47/38 para 7 
86 Ms AT v Hungary, CEDAW Committee, Communication No 2/2003 (adopted 26 January 
2005) UN Doc CEDAW/C/32/D/2/2003 para 7.4 
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4.1.2 Non-binding gender-specific instruments 
and institutions 
4.1.2.1 DEVAW 
The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women 
(DEVAW)87 was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1994. DEVAW 
refers to violence against women occurring in the family, in the public and 
violence attributable to the state.88 Both domestic violence and non-spousal 
violence are specifically addressed in the text – physical, sexual and 
psychological.89 It prescribes that states should prevent and investigate this 
violence, prosecute and punish the perpetrators, and provide remedy for the 
victim.90 
 
4.1.2.2 Beijing declaration and platform for action 
The fourth World Conference on Women took place in Beijing in 1995. The 
conference was hosted by the UN and 189 states were represented.91 The 
Beijing Declaration, drafted at the conference, reveals that states are resolute 
to 'prevent and eliminate all forms of violence against women and girls'92. It 
refers to domestic violence in relation to health issues93 and further claims 
that violence against women impairs and nullifies her ability to enjoy other 
human rights.94 
 
4.1.2.3 The Special Rapporteur on violence against 
women 
UN Commission on Human Rights appointed a Special Rapporteur on 
violence against women, its causes and consequences (Special Rapporteur). 
The mandate of the Special Rapporteur is, i.a., to find information on 
violence against women as well as receive such information and adopt and 
recommend measures to eliminate violence against women.95 The Special 
Rapporteur is writing reports on specific forms of violence and doing 
country visits. 
 
                                                
87 DEVAW (adopted 20 December 1993) UN Doc A/RES/48/104 
88 DEVAW (adopted 20 December 1993) UN Doc A/RES/48/104 art 2 
89 DEVAW (adopted 20 December 1993) UN Doc A/RES/48/104 art 2(a) 
90 DEVAW (adopted 20 December 1993) UN Doc A/RES/48/104 art 4 
91 See the official website of UN Women 
<http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/beijingdeclaration.html> accessed 15 
September 2012 
92 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (15 September 1995) UN Doc 
A/CONF.177/20/Add.1 para 29 
93 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (15 September 1995) UN Doc 
A/CONF.177/20/Add.1 para 100 
94 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (15 September 1995) UN Doc 
A/CONF.177/20/Add.1 para 224 
95 UNCHR Resolution 1994/45 (adopted 4 March 1994) 
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The second Special Rapporteur, Yakin Ertürk, has taken the standpoint that 
there is a rule of customary international law that obliges states to act in due 
diligence in order to prevent and respond to violence against women. As a 
base for her claim, Ertürk points at the practice of states and opinio juris.96 
 
The Special Rapporteur's report on violence in the family provided a draft 
model legislation. The purpose was to assist states in their work of meeting 
and adopting the international requirements in regard to domestic violence. 
Stressing the legislative obligations of states has been answered in the way 
of enactment of special legislation on domestic violence in various states. 
As of 2006, 89 states were reported having legislation addressing domestic 
violence, while 60 of these states had specific domestic violence laws.97 
 
4.1.2.4 Implications and comments 
Declarations are not legally binding instruments. Adopting a contemporary 
approach to customary international law would however recognise DEVAW 
as a legal norm prohibiting violence against women – it is a UN General 
Assembly declaration adopted with a near-unanimous vote and a statement 
of the opinio juris of member states. Referring to article 2(a) of DEVAW, 
systemic intimate violence as well as systemic violence would consequently 
be prohibited if adopting the contemporary approach. 
 
The fourth World Conference had a representative value, however, its merits 
in respect of systemic violence as a violation of international customary law 
is more doubtful. The Beijing Declaration does not claim that this form of 
violence is a violation of human rights in itself. At its best, the conference 
may bring the opinion of these states that all forms of violence against 
women is of an international concern and that states are responsible to 
prevent and protect women from systemic violence. 
 
The appointment of a Special Rapporteur specifically targeting violence 
against women is a great contribution to the recognition of the international 
elements of systemic violence. The enactment of special legislation on 
domestic violence in various states may be evidence of states thinking there 
are international obligations to protect women from systemic violence and 
to respond to the same as well as the belief that they must comply with these 
obligations. 
                                                
96 UNCHR, 'The due diligence standard as a tool for the elimination of violence against 
women – Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and 
consequences', Yakin Ertürk (30 January 2006) UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/61 para 29 
97 UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women, '15 Years of the United Nations 
Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences 1994-2009 – a 
critical review' (25 November 2008) 11-12 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Women/15YearReviewofVAWMandate.pdf> 
accessed 20 September 2012 
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4.1.3 Mainstream UN instruments and bodies 
4.1.3.1 UN General Assembly resolutions 
UN General Assembly passed its first resolution on domestic violence in 
1985, Resolution 40/36.98 It invites member states concerned to take action 
in order to prevent domestic violence and to obtain appropriate assistance to 
victims.99 It further invites member states to amend their criminal and civil 
legislation as to address domestic violence as well as adopt measures in 
order to enact and enforce these laws.100 UN bodies and the Secretary-
General are urged to take measures to combat domestic violence – 
elucidating its public element.101 
 
Five years later, the second resolution on domestic violence was adopted by 
the UN General Assembly.102 Although it was not until the third resolution 
on domestic violence was passed that, arguably, additional developments 
were taken – Resolution 58/147 on elimination of domestic violence against 
women.103 The preamble states that 'domestic violence against women and 
girls is a human rights issue'104. It refers to domestic violence as not only 
occurring in marital relationships, but also between individuals related 
through blood or intimacy.105 Of importance is also its recognition of 
domestic violence as being of a public concern and that it requires states to 
take serious action.106 The resolution encompasses a specific reference to 
the responsibility of states to protect women from, and prevent, domestic 
violence also when this violence is condoned by the state.107 
 
In 2005 the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 59/167 on the 
elimination of all forms of violence against women, addressing violence in 
the public as well as in the private sphere.108 Resolution 61/143 on the 
intensification of efforts to eliminate all forms of violence against women 
recognises that all forms of violence against women violate her enjoyment 
of all human rights and fundamental freedoms.109 This resolution is more 
precise and specific in how violence against women is perceived within the 
UN General Assembly in the way this form of violence is interconnected 
with poverty, health, economic and social standards, marginalisation of 
violence, and custom and religion, as well as in its recommendations to the 
states. It also stresses that there are obstacles in the implementation of the 
international standards in regard to violence against women and that states 
                                                
98 UNGA Res 40/36 (29 November 1985) UN Doc A/RES/40/36 
99 UNGA Res 40/36 (29 November 1985) UN Doc A/RES/40/36 art 2 
100 UNGA Res 40/36 (29 November 1985) UN Doc A/RES/40/36 art 7(a) and (b) 
101 UNGA Res 40/36 (29 November 1985) UN Doc A/RES/40/36 art 5 
102 UNGA Res 45/114 (14 December 1990) UN Doc A/RES/45/114 
103 UNGA Res 58/147 (19 February 2004) UN Doc A/RES/58/147 
104 UNGA Res 58/147 (19 February 2004) UN Doc A/RES/58/147 preamble 
105 UNGA Res 58/147 (19 February 2004) UN Doc A/RES/58/147 para 1(a) 
106 UNGA Res 58/147 (19 February 2004) UN Doc A/RES/58/147 para 1(d) 
107 UNGA Res 58/147 (19 February 2004) UN Doc A/RES/58/147 para 3 
108 UNGA Res 59/167 (22 February 2005) UN Doc A/RES/59/167 para 8 
109 UNGA Res 61/143 (30 January 2007) UN Doc A/RES/61/143 preamble 
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must criminalise all forms of violence.110 Never before has the UN General 
Assembly, in a resolution, expressly taken the position that tradition and 
custom cannot be invoked as a justification for any forms of violence.111 
 
Two additional resolutions on the intensification of efforts to eliminate all 
forms of violence against women were passed in 2008 and 2009.112 The 
latter is adding to the obligations of states in combating violence against 
women. It develops and specifies the responsibilities of states in that it 
stresses the important role of the family and it urges the engagement of men 
and boys.113 I argue that placing a bigger responsibility on men is a key 
factor in combating violence against women. 
 
4.1.3.2 Other UN resolutions 
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, with the mandate 
to promote and protect human rights all over the world and to mainstream 
human rights within the UN, has adopted a resolution addressing violence 
against women. It emphasises the duty of states to exercise due diligence to 
prevent, investigate and punish violence against women.114 
 
The Commission on Human Rights and the Human Rights Council have 
also passed a number of resolutions addressing violence against women.  
The former has adopted resolutions that urge for the elimination of domestic 
violence and encourages other UN bodies to consider violence against 
women in their specific work.115 
 
The Human Rights Council has passed resolutions that address the need to 
incorporate human rights of women into the work of the UN116, emphasise 
the link between violence against women and discrimination and that 
strongly condemns all violence against women occurring both in the public 
and private sphere.117 Moreover, it has requested treaty bodies and other 
bodies to analyse within their particular area of human rights how violence 
is affecting women, with the aim to incorporate this into their work.118 
                                                
110 UNGA Res 61/143 (30 January 2007) UN Doc A/RES/61/143 paras 4 and 6 
111 UNGA Res 61/143 (30 January 2007) UN Doc A/RES/61/143 para 5 
112 UNGA Res 62/133 (7 February 2008) UN Doc A/RES/62/133; UNGA Res 63/155 (30 
January 2009) UN Doc A/RES/ 63/155 
113 UNGA Res 63/155 (30 January 2009) UN Doc A/RES/ 63/155 paras 6 and 15 
114 UNCHR Res 2002/50 Integrating the Human Rights of Women throughout the United 
Nations system (23 April 2002) UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2002/50 
115 UNHCR Res 2001/49 Elimination of Violence against Women (24 April 2001) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/2001/49 paras 2, 22-26 
116 UNHRC Res 6/30 Integrating the Human Rights of Women throughout the United 
Nations system (14 December 2007) UN Doc A/HRC/6/30 
117 UNHRC Res 7/24 Elimination of Violence against Women (28 March 2008) UN Doc 
A/HRC/7/42 preamble, para 1 
118 UNHRC Res 6/30 Integrating the Human Rights of Women throughout the United 
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4.1.3.3 UN Secretary-General report 
In 2006, the Secretary-General published the report In-depth study on all 
forms of violence against women.119 In the report Kofi Annan, who was the 
Secretary-General at the time, classifies violence against women as a human 
rights violation, although not as a human right violation in itself. The 
classification encompasses both domestic violence and acquaintance rape. 
This conclusion is drawn from a study of various national and regional 
instruments and bodies.120 The report is specific in its acknowledgment of a 
detailed and wide range of obligations of states in order to comply with the 
international obligation to prohibit violence against women.121 It confirms 
that this violence is of a public concern122 and recognises the high 
prevalence of both domestic violence and acquaintance violence.123 
 
4.1.3.4 General Comment No 28 
General Comment No 28 was adopted by the UN Human Rights Committee 
in the year of 2000, which is responsible for the implementation of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).124 This 
document is a commentary on article 3 of the ICCPR, which provides states 
to 'ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil 
and political rights'125, in the covenant. It refers to discriminatory actions 
taking place both in the public and the private sphere126 as well as 
recognising that violations of women's rights have its roots in tradition, 
history, religion and culture.127 
 
In the commentary, the UN Human Rights Committee further states that in 
order to comply with article 7 of the ICCPR, there is a need for states to 
provide information on domestic laws and practices with regard to domestic 
violence, rape and other forms of violence.128 Article 7 of the covenant 
provides that '[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
                                                
119 UN Secretary-General, 'In-depth study on all forms of violence against women' (2006) 
UN Doc A/61/122/Add.1 
120 UN Secretary-General, 'In-depth study on all forms of violence against women' (2006) 
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124 ICCPR (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) UNGA Res 
2200A (XXI) 
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degrading treatment or punishment'129. By doing so, General Comment No 
28 brought violence within the private sphere into the scope of the ICCPR. 
 
4.1.3.5 Implications and comments 
The language in Resolution 40/36 as well as Resolution 45/114 are not 
authoritative. They 'invite' member states to do certain matters, suggesting 
the resolutions being advisory in nature. Referring to member states 
'concerned' as opposed to all member states, also suggests the permissive 
character. 
 
The language in Resolution 58/147 is more authoritative than in previous 
resolutions. Instead of 'inviting' states to take certain actions, the language is 
replaced by words as 'strongly condemns' and 'serious action'. This 
resolution is progressing in that it directly states that domestic violence is a 
human rights issue, although this is not the same as declaring that domestic 
violence is a violation of human rights. 
 
Recognising that all forms of violence against women violate her enjoyment 
of all human rights and fundamental freedoms, was first expressly spelled 
out in the resolution passed in 2007, Resolution 61/143. Doing so 22 years 
after the first resolution on domestic violence was passed, proves how 
sensitive this issue is as well as the reluctance from the international 
community to step into the private sphere. In the same resolution, the UN 
General Assembly further stressed that there are obstacles in the 
implementation of the international standards in respect of violence against 
women. In doing so, the Assembly implies that the states are obliged to 
comply with what is set out in their resolutions, otherwise they are in breach 
of international law. 
 
Notwithstanding the non-authoritative language in the resolutions they do 
express how the member states think the law ought to be, thus paving the 
way for a standard of state-practice. According to the contemporary 
approach to customary international law, UN General Assembly resolutions 
may constitute opinio juris – being statements passed by 193 member states 
ought to be evidence of what these states believe they are obliged to do in 
order to comply with international law. 
 
None of the UN General Assembly resolutions explicitly state that violence 
against women is a violation of human rights in itself. However, examining 
the recently passed resolutions, it is evident that they claim that violence 
against women violates her enjoyment of all human rights, both systemic 
intimate violence and systemic violence, and that states are obliged under 
international law to take measures to protect women from systemic violence 
as well as to investigate, prosecute and punish the perpetrators. 
 
                                                
129 ICCPR (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) UNGA Res 
2200A (XXI) art 7 
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The UN Human Rights Council is an inter-governmental body within the 
UN with the mandate to address violations of human rights as well as to 
make recommendations on them. The Council is comprised of 47 member 
states and as being a state-driven institution, its recommendations on 
specific human rights issues are of significant importance in respect to 
international lawmaking.130 
 
The report by the Secretary-General is an important contribution in finding a 
norm prohibiting systemic violence in customary international law. By 
acknowledging that there are international responsibilities of states in regard 
to systemic violence, it confirms that this form of violence has a place in 
international human rights law. It is also a significant contribution in being a 
report written by the Secretary-General as having a non-gender-specific 
position. 
 
General Comment No 28 is authoritative for two main reasons. First, it 
constitutes a huge step in the process of mainstreaming women's human 
rights and more specifically systemic violence. Second, bringing domestic 
violence and rape into the provision concerning torture and inhuman 
treatment, acknowledges that private acts of violence are as cruel as acts of 
violence committed by state authorities. 
 
4.2 The approach of regional human 
rights law to systemic violence 
This subchapter will examine instruments and bodies within three different 
regions of the world, namely Europe, America and Africa. 
 
4.2.1 European system 
4.2.1.1 ECHR 
The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR)131 does not provide an explicit prohibition on sexual 
violence. The ECtHR has, however, interpreted articles 3 and 8 of the 
ECHR as to place positive obligations on states to take steps to ensure that 
individuals are protected from rape and other forms of sexual violence. 
Article 3 of the ECHR ensures the prohibition of torture; '[n]o one shall be 
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment'132. 
                                                
130 See the official website of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN 
Human Rights Council 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/AboutCouncil.aspxhttp://www.ohchr.or
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131 ECHR, as amended by Protocols Nos 11 and 14 (adopted 4 November 1950, entered 
into force 3 September 1953) 
132 ECHR, as amended by Protocols Nos 11 and 14 (adopted 4 November 1950, entered 
into force 3 September 1953) art 3 
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Article 8 of the ECHR provides that '[e]veryone has the right to respect for 
his private and family life, his home and his correspondence'133. There have 
not been many rulings by the ECtHR on cases concerning rape and it was 
not until 2007 when domestic violence was directly addressed by the 
ECtHR. However, this issue has now been addressed in a series of cases. 
 
4.2.1.2 Jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
In Opuz v Turkey134, the ECtHR found a violation of article 3 of the ECHR 
due to the state's failure to take protective measures in order to protect the 
applicant from domestic violence.135 The Court took the position that 
domestic violence may be of the severity as to reach the threshold of harm 
to trigger international law. 
 
The only case before the ECtHR concerning an acquaintance rape is the case 
of MC v Bulgaria.136 The applicant was a fourteen-year-old girl who alleged 
that she had been raped twice during the same night by two different men. 
In the domestic proceedings none of the alleged perpetrators denied having 
sexual intercourse with the applicant, but said that she had consented. 
 
The ECtHR found that Bulgaria was in breach of articles 3 and 8 of the 
ECHR. In the assessment, the ECtHR looked at whether the Bulgarian state 
had fulfilled its positive obligations under the two provisions and elaborated 
on the reach of the due diligence obligation. The ECtHR found that the 
practice to prosecute acts of rape only where there is evidence of significant 
physical force, as alleged by the applicant, was not refuted by the Bulgarian 
state. Since the authorities had focused on 'direct' proof in order to prove 
lack of consent, they had failed in their investigation to establish all the 
surrounding circumstances. The ECtHR held that Bulgaria's positive 
obligations entailed to adopt criminal law and to effectively punish all forms 
of rape, as well as execute this legislation by effectively investigate and 
prosecute allegations of rape.137 
 
4.2.1.3 Council of Europe resolutions 
The resolutions adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe are authoritative and important evidence of customary international 
law. The Assembly consists of people from national parliaments from 47 
member states, thus representing a considerable part of the states in the 
world. 
 
The Council of Europe has passed several resolutions addressing violence 
against women. Resolution 1512, which was adopted in 2006, confirms that 
domestic violence against women is 'one of the most widespread violations 
                                                
133 ECHR (adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) art 8(1) 
134 Opuz v Turkey App no 33401/02 (ECtHR 9 June 2009) 
135 Opuz v Turkey App no 33401/02 (ECtHR 9 June 2009) para 176 
136 MC v Bulgaria App no 39272/98 (ECtHR 4 December 2003) 
137 MC v Bulgaria App no 39272/98 (ECtHR 4 December 2003) paras 169-182 
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of human rights'138 and emphasises the obligation of states to combat this 
violence in all member states.139 
 
4.2.1.4 Council of Europe Convention on preventing 
and combating violence against women and 
domestic violence 
In 2011, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted the 
Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and 
domestic violence.140 As of September 2012, it has been signed by 23 states 
and ratified by one state. It has not yet entered into force due to the lack of 
ratifications needed in order to enter into force.141 
 
This legally binding instrument is providing a comprehensive legal 
framework to protect women against all forms of violence, and prevent, 
prosecute and eliminate violence against women.142 It entails specific 
definitions of different acts of violence as well as an extensive scope of state 
obligations. Violence against women is understood as a form of 
discrimination against women as well as a violation of human rights.143 
 
4.2.1.5 Implications and comments 
The jurisprudence of the ECtHR is a source of international law. In the 
ruling in the case of Opuz v Turkey, the Court established that domestic 
violence is a form of violence triggering international law, thereby 
acknowledging the internationalising elements of intimate violence. The 
recognition of domestic violence as a human rights issue is a crucial 
development as the ECtHR steps into the private sphere by obliging the 
state to take positive measures in order to protect women from ill-treatment 
and their respect for private and family life. 
 
Following the ruling in MC v Bulgaria, the ECtHR indicates that rape will 
always fall within the scope of article 3 of the ECHR, i.e., rape constitutes 
sufficient severity as to meet the threshold for ill-treatment. This case is also 
significant since it is the first case before the ECtHR concerning 
acquaintance rape. The case of MC v Bulgaria further implies that when a 
                                                
138 Council of Europe, 'Resolution 1512 Parliaments United in Combating Domestic 
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state fails in an individual case, which can be linked to a systemic problem 
of a restrictive approach in the prosecution of rape, the state may be in 
breach of the ECHR. In doing so, the ECtHR acknowledges violence against 
women as being systemic and structural. 
 
There are several aspects of relevance in the reasoning of the ECtHR in the 
case of MC v Bulgaria; the adoption of an international definition of rape as 
to encompass any non-consensual sexual act, irrespective of physical 
resistance by the victim144; the consideration of the ECtHR under both 
article 3 and article 8 of the ECHR, recognising rape as violating physical 
integrity and personal and sexual autonomy as well as declaring that an act 
of rape infringes fundamental values145; the obligation to not only create 
necessary measures but also to ensure an effective investigation and 
prosecution; and the recognition of the systemic and structural nature of this 
violence. 
 
The definition of violence against women as constituting a violation of 
human rights, as stated in the Council of Europe Convention on violence 
against women, is of great significance. This means that the drafters took 
the position of declaring that violence against women is a violation of 
human rights per se. Although this convention is not yet in force, it does 
provide a significant evidence of opinio juris. 
 
4.2.2 Inter-American system and African 
system 
4.2.2.1 The Convention of Belem Do Para 
The Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and 
Eradication of Violence against Women, known as the Convention of Belem 
Do Para146, binds signatories of the Inter-American system. It was adopted 
in 1994 and as of September 2012, 32 states have ratified the convention.147  
 
The Convention of Belem Do Para addresses violence against women in the 
public and private sphere.148 It has a detailed prohibition of both domestic 
violence and acquaintance violence when referring to violence that 'occurs 
within the family or domestic unit or within any other interpersonal 
relationship, whether or not the perpetrator shares or has shared the same 
residence with the woman, including, among others, rape, battery and sexual 
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abuse'149. In addition, it institutes a right to be free from violence and 
establishes a responsibility on states to fulfil this right.150 
 
4.2.2.2 African Union instruments 
In 2003 the African Union adopted the Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa.151 As of 
September 2012, 28 states have ratified the Protocol, whereas an additional 
18 states have signed it but not yet ratified the same.152 
 
The Protocol on the rights of women in Africa does not explicitly refer to 
specific forms of violence; it addresses 'all forms of violence'. It 
acknowledges every woman's right to respect for life, integrity and security 
of person and that 'all forms of exploitation, cruel, inhuman or degrading, 
punishment and treatment shall be prohibited'153. The states have a 
corresponding responsibility to ensure the prohibition of all forms of 
violence, including the enactment and enforcement of laws.154 
 
The African Union has also adopted a framework to eliminate domestic 
violence by 2015.155 
 
4.2.2.3 Implications and comments 
The most important contribution of the Convention of Belem Do Para of a 
norm prohibiting systemic violence in international human rights law is that 
it establishes a specific and explicit right to be free from violence. In that 
way it is more authoritative than many other legal instruments. Together 
with the Council of Europe Convention on violence against women, it 
definitely brings a prohibition of systemic violence closer to constituting 
international law. However, its regional character limits its strength as proof 
of customary international law.  
 
There are 53 member states in the African Union and 46 of these have 
signed the Protocol on the rights of women in Africa. Adding this 
significant number of parties to the fact that it is a legally binding treaty, 
                                                
149 Convention of Belem Do Para (adopted 9 June 1994, entered into force 5 March 1995) 
art 2(a) 
150 Convention of Belem Do Para (adopted 9 June 1994, entered into force 5 March 1995) 
art 3 
151 The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Rights of 
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November 2003, entered into force 25 November 2005) 
152 See the official website of the African Commission on Human and People's Rights 
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153 The Protocol on the rights of women in Africa (adopted 7 November 2003, entered into 
force 25 November 2005) art 4(1) 
154 The Protocol on the rights of women in Africa (adopted 7 November 2003, entered into 
force 25 November 2005) art 4(2)(a) 
155 First African Union Conference of Ministers Responsible for Women and Gender, 
Implementation Framework of the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa' 
(Dakar, Senegal October 2005) AU/MIN/CONF/WG/3(1) 
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provides a good evidence of a principle in international law obliging the 
states to protect women from systemic violence. This is a strong statement 
of the states beliefs that they have an obligation to protect women from 
systemic violence as well as an obligation to investigate and punish the 
perpetrators. 
 
4.3 A few aspects of the gendered nature 
of the regime in regard to systemic 
violence 
One of the main critiques of the human rights regime as not being gender-
inclusive is the provision of torture in international law. Torture has been 
recognised as being male-gendered in nature, partly because of the 
requirement of the perpetrator being a state official. In the early 1990s, legal 
scholars increasingly studied the analogy of rape and domestic violence to 
torture. From the victim's perspective, these forms of violence committed by 
a state agent or by a private person may not be different at all. 
 
This subchapter is exploring the international provisions on torture in the 
light of systemic violence and the gendered nature of the public/private 
dichotomy with the aim to see if the provisions on torture are still gendered. 
 
4.3.1 The gendered nature of the UNCAT’s 
definition of torture 
Article 1(1) of the UNCAT defines torture as 'any act by which severe pain 
or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a 
person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person 
information or a confession […] when such pain or suffering is inflicted by 
or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official'156. 
 
There are several gendered aspects of this definition. The first aspect is the 
requirement of consent or acquiescence of a public official. Radical feminist 
scholar argue that this is contributing to the gendered nature of the 
public/private divide since the victim is most likely to be a man and 
violence against women is consequently falling outside the scope of the 
definition – due to this form of violence appearing in the private sphere.157 
 
                                                
156 UNCAT (adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987) UNGA Res 
39/46 art 1(1) (emphasis added) 
157 See e.g. Alice Edwards, 'The 'Feminizing' of Torture under International Human Rights 
Law' (2006) 19 Leiden Journal of International Law 349, 368 
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This apprehension has appeared to be real if looking at the jurisprudence of 
the UNCAT Committee. In GRB v Sweden158, the applicant claimed that she 
had been raped by members of a guerrilla group and she feared to be raped 
again upon return to Peru. On that ground she argued that Sweden would 
violate the UNCAT if forcing her to return.159 The UNCAT Committee 
found no breach since the state party does not violate the convention when 
the expelled person might risk being tortured by a non-state agent, without 
the consent or acquiescence of the government.160 This decision was 
reached despite the fact that the rape had been reported to the police, thus 
leaving the police with knowledge about the situation.161 
 
The reasoning of the UNCAT in the case of GRB v Sweden has been 
criticised for cementing the gendered nature of the public/private divide in 
international human rights law. The criticism comprise the lack of the 
UNCAT Committee to consider the issue of state acquiescence. If there 
would be an analysis of the link between the state and the act of rape, it 
would entail whether a proper investigation of the rape was done by the 
state, the number of reported rapes that had not been investigated, as well as 
whether the rape was possible due to lack of state action.162 This reasoning – 
or lack thereof – disclose a confusion and a lack of knowledge by the 
UNCAT committee in how 'acquiescence' should be applied.163 There is a 
similar reasoning by the UNCAT Committee in SV et al v Canada164, where 
the Committee failed to recognise abuse of non-state actors as falling within 
the torture provision. 
 
Expanding on the reasoning in the case of Hajrizi Dzemajl et al v 
Yugoslavia165, it might imply a possibility to hold a state responsible for a 
specific act of sexual violence committed by a private actor, when failing to 
take appropriate measures in order to protect the applicant. However, this 
could be the case only if the state was having knowledge about the specific 
situation. 
 
A second gendered aspect of the definition of torture is the requirement of 
the suffering to be inflicted for a particular purpose, for instance the purpose 
of obtaining a confession or information. This prerequisite is, to a great 
extent, narrowing the reach of the provision. It is claimed to mainly 
encompass abuses perpetrated in state custody, thus a situation more suited 
to protect the experiences of men.166  
                                                
158 GRB v Sweden (1998) UN Doc CAT/C/20/D/83/1997 
159 GRB v Sweden (1998) UN Doc CAT/C/20/D/83/1997, para 3.1 
160 GRB v Sweden (1998) UN Doc CAT/C/20/D/83/1997, para 6.5 
161 GRB v Sweden (1998) UN Doc CAT/C/20/D/83/1997, para 2.3 
162 Robert McCorquodale and Rebecca La Forgia, 'Taking off the Blindfolds: Torture By 
Non-state Actors' (2001) 1 Human Rights Law Review 189, 209-210 
163 Alice Edwards, 'The 'Feminizing' of Torture under International Human Rights Law' 
(2006) 19 Leiden Journal of International Law 349, 371-372 
164 SV et al v Canada (1996) UN Doc CAT/C/26/D/49/1996 
165 Hajrizi Dzemajl et al v Yugoslavia (2002) UN Doc CAT/C/29/D/161/2000 
166 Alice Edwards, 'The 'Feminizing' of Torture under International Human Rights Law' 
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A third criticism in relation to the gendered nature of the definition of 
torture is the use of the masculine pronoun 'him' – it implies that torture only 
takes place in the context of investigations by the state of criminal acts. It is 
argued that the language in legal instruments is essential in the construction 
and reinforcement of the subordinate position of women. It is claimed to 
take away the human factor in the context.167 
 
4.3.2 Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
torture 
Manfred Nowak, the Special Rapporteur on torture, submitted a report in 
2008 on torture where he exclusively addressed torture in relation to 
violence against women.168 The purpose with the report was to make torture 
gender-inclusive and in so doing, the report draws on the parallels between 
'classic' torture and domestic violence among other forms of violence 
against women. 
 
An important commentary in the report is found in regard to the role of the 
state. As mentioned above, the definition of torture requires the act to be 
'inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a 
public official'169. This element has been used to limit the state 
responsibility to the public sphere. However, the Special Rapporteur 
confirms that by using words such as 'consent' and 'acquiescence' in the text, 
it evidently extends the obligations of states into the private sphere.170 The 
report acknowledges that state acquaintance can take many different forms. 
State responsibility is engaged when i.a., a state implements discriminatory 
laws due to the state's complicity in domestic violence, and when a state 
fails to protect women from this violence as well as to prevent these acts.171 
 
Nowak further acknowledges that the 'purpose' element in the definition of 
torture is always fulfilled when there is an act of violence against a woman. 
This is because one of the features listed in the definition is discrimination 
                                                
167 See e.g. Hilary Charlesworth, 'What are ”Women's International Human Rights”?' in 
Rebecca J Cook (ed), Human rights of women: National and International Perspectives 
(University of Pennsylvania Press 1994) 68 
168 UNHRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, Manfred Nowak (15 January 2008) UN Doc 
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170 UNHRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, Manfred Nowak (15 January 2008) UN Doc 
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and due to the fact that gender-specific violence is a form of discrimination 
this element is always fulfilled.172 
 
The report is not specifically discussing acquaintance rape, although it is 
mentioned in the text that the list of forms of violence that may constitute 
torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment is not exhaustive and it 
does mention that sexual violence may fall under the provision.173 
 
4.3.3 Rape as torture under article 3 of the 
ECHR 
The ECtHR recognised for the first time that an act of rape could constitute 
torture in the judgement of Aydin v Turkey.174 In this case, a seventeen-year-
old woman was raped by a member of the security forces while she was in 
custody. This was groundbreaking in that the ECtHR acknowledged that 
rape could reach the severity of harm to amount to torture. On the other side, 
this is the only ruling where the Court has recognised rape as torture – and 
the perpetrator was an agent of the state. This leaves us with the question if 
rape can constitute torture when the perpetrator is a private individual. 
 
The purposive criterion for torture has been widely criticised by feminist 
scholars due to the suggestion that torture only takes place within state 
detention and similar institutions. An examination of the ECtHR's 
jurisprudence reveals that this element has comprised getting information of 
some sort or a confession.175 Recognising the discriminatory purpose of rape 
as fulfilling the purposive element is still absent in the Court's 
jurisprudence.176 
 
Clare McGlynn argues, by way of analysing the ECtHR's jurisprudence, that 
whether an act of rape constitutes torture is not solely dependant upon the 
status of the perpetrator, rather it depends on several criterion such as, in 
addition to the status of the perpetrator, the age and sex of the victim, the 
place of the rape as well as the abuse of trust.177 The case of Kaya v 
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Turkey178 is one of the cases that McGlynn is referring to as supporting her 
standpoint that there must not be a direct act of a state official in order to 
constitute torture. McGlynn argues that since the Court kept on discussing 
whether an act of harm amounted to torture even when the Court had noted 
that state agents were not directly responsible for the death of the person in 
question, was a clear implication of this.179 
 
4.3.4 Implications and comments 
The report of the Special Rapporteur on torture is of big significance in the 
process of developing a norm in international human rights law prohibiting 
domestic violence. It is authoritative in several aspects: 1) it is a report 
written by the Special Rapporteur on torture; 2) the report is expanding the 
provisions on torture as to include domestic violence as well as 
acquaintance rape; 3) this is done in regard to a UN mainstream legally 
binding convention and; 4) defining domestic violence as an act of torture 
brings considerable weight to engage the responsibility of states and, thus, 
as the status of domestic violence as a human rights violation. 
 
One of the critiques of the torture provision is that it requires the act of harm 
to be for some 'purpose'. Due to the report of the Special Rapporteur on 
torture, this criticism may have been answered and likewise the connection 
to a state official. 
 
However, the report of the Special Rapporteur on torture is not in line with 
the jurisprudence of the UNCAT Committee. The Committee is restrictive 
in its interpretation of acts of violence committed by non-state actors. The 
reasoning of the Committee further implies a requirement of an actual 
knowledge by the state of a specific situation. If considering systemic 
violence in the light of this solid established link between the state and the 
perpetrator is to a considerable extent leaving systemic violence against 
women outside the scope of state responsibility. 
 
The torture provision in UNCAT has been re-interpreted as to better 
encompass the specific situation of women. Some of the criticism has been 
answered but, although the report in itself is contributing to a less gendered 
nature of the torture provision as well as to the notion of systemic violence 
as a prohibition in international human rights law, there is a need to be 
cautious in not exaggerating the contribution of the report before being 
aware of how the torture provision will be interpreted and applied by the 
Human Rights Committee in future cases. 
 
The issue in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR is not whether the acts of 
private individuals fall within the provision of ill-treatment and torture, it is 
rather the question of whether rape can only amount to the severity of 
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torture when committed by a state official. This classification is not relevant 
when considering state responsibility under international law but it adds to 
the perception that a private act of rape is less severe as well as having a 
lower status as a prohibition in international law. Compared to the torture 
provision in UNCAT, the provision on torture in ECHR is less gendered. 
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5 Analysis 
The most authoritative source of international law is international 
conventions. As has been discovered in this thesis, there is no international 
convention specifically addressing violence against women. CEDAW 
addresses discrimination against women but not violence against women. 
Notwithstanding a partial correction of this textual gap when the General 
Recommendation No 19 was passed, it did not to any appreciable extent 
contribute to bringing systemic violence closer to being a violation of 
human rights due to general recommendations not being binding upon states 
party to CEDAW. Furthermore, the standpoint taken in the recommendation 
is that violence against women is a form of discrimination which impairs or 
nullifies a woman's enjoyment of her human rights. An examination of the 
jurisprudence of the CEDAW Committee, however, provides clear evidence 
that the Committee is of the opinion that domestic violence is prohibited and 
that states have an obligation under international law to protect women from 
this form of violence. 
 
The principle in DEVAW is that violence against women is prohibited both 
in the public and the private sphere. Moreover, the position taken in the 
Beijing Declaration is that violence against women impairs and nullifies her 
ability to enjoy other human rights whereas the second Special Rapporteur 
on violence against women, Yakin Ertürk, has taken the standpoint that 
there is a rule of customary international law that obliges states to act in due 
diligence in order to prevent and respond to violence against women. 
 
There are a fairly big number of UN mainstream instruments addressing 
violence against women. It is evident from a study of UN General Assembly 
resolutions that the Assembly claims that there is a prohibition of systemic 
violence within international law and that states have a corresponding 
obligation to prevent systemic violence and to protect women from the 
same, as well as to investigate, prosecute and punish the perpetrators. 
 
Furthermore, in the report written by the Secretary-General, Kofi Annan 
classifies violence against women as a human rights violation and 
acknowledges that states have a responsibility under international law to 
respond to all forms of violence, specifically addressing domestic violence 
and acquaintance rape. 
 
In addition, the adoption of General Comment No 28 by the UN Human 
Rights Committee is a striking evidence of the mainstreaming of violence 
against women as well as an attempt to erase the line between the 
public/private divide. It is authoritative in acknowledging that domestic 
violence, although not perpetrated by state officials, is no less dreadful than 
violence committed by the state, thus being a form of ill-treatment. 
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In the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the Court has taken the standpoint that 
both domestic violence and acquaintance rape trigger international law and 
that these forms of violence are forms of ill-treatment. The ECtHR is clear 
in that states have a responsibility to protect women from systemic violence 
as well as an obligation to ensure an effective investigation and prosecution. 
 
The most progressive developments in how systemic violence is understood 
are found within the European and Inter-American systems. The Council of 
Europe Convention on violence against women explicitly states that 
violence against women is a violation of human rights per se. A similar 
position is found in the Convention of Belem Do Para as constituting an 
explicit right to be free from systemic violence. 
 
To conclude so far, it is evident that, even though not expressly stated in all 
the instruments analysed, courts, monitoring bodies and other institutions 
claim that systemic violence is prohibited and that states have a 
corresponding duty to respond to this violence. The general principle found 
is that violence against women impairs or nullifies a woman's ability to 
enjoy her human rights. This standpoint differs from a principle proclaiming 
that violence against women is a violation of human rights per se. The 
notion is that individual people violate national laws whereas states violate 
international laws. Moreover, the legal consequences and the obligations of 
states may, arguably, not be that different. In both scenarios, systemic 
violence against women is prohibited and states thereby have a 
responsibility under international law to protect women from this form of 
violence. But, when failing to see systemic violence against women as a 
violation of human rights in itself, the human rights regime is partly denying 
the structural and systemic nature of this violence, i.e., the state’s 
participation and responsibility every single time a woman is being the 
victim of an act of systemic violence. These acts of violence are not isolated 
from one another and the state’s role in sustaining the violence is thereby 
not being adequately acknowledged. 
 
I am of the opinion that if establishing that systemic violence against 
women is a violation of international human rights law per se, there would 
be a more solid connection between the act of violence and the state. 
Furthermore, such a principle would be weightier and most likely result in 
states regarding systemic violence as a more serious human rights violation. 
 
What I claim, hitherto, is that there is a principle prohibiting systemic 
violence. However, this is not the same as claiming that there is an 
international law prohibiting systemic violence. In order to find out about 
whether there is such a prohibition in international law we must examine 
this knowledge in the light of how a principle becomes a legal principle – an 
international law. 
 
As has already been established, there is no international treaty prohibiting 
systemic violence. Next step is therefore to examine whether there is such a 
prohibition in customary international law. 
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The traditional approach to customary international law requires a consistent 
practice of states, being both widespread and established. It also requires the 
element of opinio juris. The widespread requirement does not involve a 
practice in every single state as long as it is general. Without digging too 
deep into the practice of states, I am willing to claim that this element is not 
fulfilled. There is no evidence of a general prohibition of systemic violence 
in the practice of states having in mind the lack of investigations and 
prosecutions as well as other measures in order to prevent and protect 
women from systemic violence. In addition, such a state practice shall exist 
in states belonging to various regional groups. Moreover, if looking at the 
ICJ's interpretation of customary international law, the practice shall be 
found in specially affected states. 
 
The contemporary approach to customary international law emphasises the 
opinio juris of states. Due to the difficulty in determining a state's actual 
belief, this subjective element is understood as statements of beliefs. As 
evident from the analysis above, there are countless of international and 
regional instruments and institutions claiming that there is a prohibition of 
systemic violence against women in international law and that states have a 
corresponding obligation to respond to this violence in order to protect 
women. 
 
The big number of documents adopted by the UN General Assembly, 
represented by 193 member states, and the UN Human Rights Council, 
being an inter-governmental body and state-driven institution, are clear and 
authoritative evidence of the opinio juris of states. Representatives from 
these states do believe that there is a prohibition of systemic violence in 
international law and they believe that they have a legal obligation to 
comply with the same. The authoritative features are even clearer 
remembering that they are mainstream UN bodies. 
 
Not only is the opinio juris of states to be found within the member states of 
the UN. The three big regions examined in this thesis – Europe, America 
and Africa – all provide clear evidence of a belief that systemic violence is 
prohibited in international law as well as the belief that they must comply 
with this prohibition. The Council of Europe Convention on violence 
against women, a previously adopted convention already signed by 23 
states, claims that violence against women is a violation of human rights in 
itself. Also, judicial judgements from the ECtHR, as being recognised as a 
source from where international principles of law can be derived from, state 
that there is a prohibition of systemic violence. 
 
Furthermore, a significant number of states within the Inter-American 
system and the African system have signed and ratified respective 
instrument. Adding to the authority of these instruments is the fact that they 
are legally binding on these states. 
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The many responses of states to statements and recommendations of 
specific measures to adopt in order to protect women from systemic 
violence, passed by various institutions, are also evidence of acting from a 
sense of legal obligation. These responses have, among others, been in the 
form of enactment of domestic legislation specifically addressing systemic 
violence and the implementation of measures in order to respond to violence 
against women in a more adequate way. 
 
Accordingly, there is a pattern among international, regional and domestic 
organs belonging to various regional groups, representing different political, 
economic and ideological approaches, stating the belief that there is an 
international law prohibiting systemic violence as well as the belief that they 
must comply with the same from a sense of legal obligation. 
 
Systemic intimate violence has been addressed to a bigger extent than 
systemic violence. This is at least clear if examining jurisprudence from the 
CEDAW Committee and the number of UN General Assembly resolutions 
specifically targeting domestic violence. Notwithstanding this, in regard to 
the evidence of a prohibition in international law, this fact should not be of 
any note. Most of the instruments and institutions as well as those being of a 
more authoritative nature in respect of customary international law, claim 
that there is a prohibition of systemic violence. 
 
The study of the provisions on torture reveals that the human rights regime 
is still gendered. Situations more likely to happen to women are treated 
differently than situations more likely to happen to men – there is a 
prohibition of torture whereas there is no explicit prohibition of systemic 
violence in any international convention and the regime is as well reluctant 
to interpret systemic violence as to fall within the torture provisions – thus 
demonstrating human rights as male rights. Furthermore, it is evident that 
the regime is failing to see the structural and systemic nature of this violence 
seeing that the UNCAT Committee persists in finding an actual knowledge 
by the state of a specific situation in order to hold a state accountable for 
acts of systemic violence. 
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6 Conclusion 
In the light of this reasoning, I conclude that there is an international human 
rights law prohibiting systemic violence. If adopting a contemporary 
approach to customary international law, there is authoritative evidence of a 
universal legal principle prohibiting systemic violence. This legal principle 
has not yet been properly crystallised, although still constituting an 
international law. 
 
There is an international law prohibiting systemic violence due to the fact 
that systemic violence impairs or nullifies a woman's ability to enjoy her 
human rights – systemic violence per se is not a violation of international 
human rights law. 
 
If adopting a traditional approach to customary international law, the 
conclusion is not the same. There is not evidence of a consistent and 
widespread state practice needed in order to establish a prohibition of 
systemic violence in customary international law. Whether a traditional or a 
contemporary approach shall be used, legal scholars are of different 
opinions. This is not a question to be answered in this thesis. However, I 
advocate the contemporary approach as being the only appropriate theory in 
respect of systemic violence against women. 
 
More needs to be done in order to adequately crystallise systemic violence 
as a violation of international human rights law. There is a need to specify 
the substance of different forms of systemic violence as well as in greater 
detail specify the responsibilities of states. The Council of Europe 
Convention on violence against women is a good model of this. The process 
of integrating systemic violence into mainstream instruments and bodies 
needs to be further developed as well as acknowledging systemic violence 
as a violation of human rights per se. If these developments were to be 
taken, systemic violence as a violation of international human rights law 
would be less contentious and it would hold a more superior status. 
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